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Growth and corruption: a complex relationship 
 
Abstract 
Purpose - This paper investigates the growth-corruption relationship in a sample of 146 
countries for the period 1984-2009. While negative effects of corruption on growth have 
drawn economists’ interest in recent years, our main contribution is to examine the effects by 
employing the hierarchical polynomial regression to evaluate the relationship after 
controlling economic and institutional factors. 
Design/methodology/approach – The results are estimated using panel generalised methods 
of moments.  
Findings - The results challenge some of the findings that negative growth-corruption 
association in the literature, but also provide some new inferences. The findings reflect that 
corruption is not always growth-inhibitory, for some countries it is growth-enhancing which 
supports the “greasing-the-wheels” hypothesis.  
Originality/value – The paper investigates the growth-corruption relationship using panel 
generalised methods of moments. Our results suggest that a cubic function best fitted the 
data. The finding suggests that in the medium corrupt countries corruption stimulates growth 
by reducing red-tape. 
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1. Introduction 
The pervasiveness of persistence corruption has been tormenting for the majority of 
developing countries (Asongo, 2013; Cameron et al., 2009). However, the theoretical 
literature provides no clear guidance on corruption-economic growth relationship.  On the 
one hand, it argues that corruption increases economic growth by enabling investors to avoid 
bureaucratic delay through the use of “speed money” and by encouraging lowly paid 
government employees to work harder if they could supplement their income by levying 
bribes (Leff 1964, Huntington 1968, Lui, 1985, De Soto 1989, Egger and Winner 2005). On 
the other hand, the theoretical literature contends that corruption has a negative effect on 
economic growth by reducing investment, both in physical and human capital (Mauro 1995, 
Keefer and Knack 1997,  Reinikka and Svensson 2005) and by leading to a misallocation of 
public expenditures away from growth-enhancing areas (such as education and health) 
towards areas which are less productivity enhancing, but are more corruption-intensive (such 
as large and expensive infrastructural projects) (Mauro 1997, Tanzi and Davoodi 1997). 
Likewise, the large empirical literature that has studied the relationship between 
corruption and economic growth also does not provide a clear and unambiguous answer to 
the question of whether corruption affects growth positively or negatively (see for example, 
Mauro 1995, Svensson 2005, Méon and Weill 2008, Aidt 2009 and Paul 2010). Whether 
corruption affects economic growth negatively or positively seems to depend greatly on the 
country and regional context (Virta 2010). Moreover, with a few exceptions the researchers' 
have focused mainly on detecting the linear effects of corruption on growth. But it remains 
unclear whether an increase in corruption consistently decreases/increases corruption across 
countries based on categorization of corruption levels. While the linear negative relationship 
between corruption and economic growth has been noted in the literature, however, the 
degree of the level of corruption impact on growth is not uniform and straight forward. The 
overall long-term trend of the entire process may resemble the downward slope portrayed by 
a linear function, but the non-linear function can discriminate the experiences of less/medium 
corrupt countries from that of the high corrupt countries.  
Moreover, the observed cross-country evidence shows a mixed growth-corruption 
relationship. For example, country like Australia demonstrates a temperate level of economic 
growth with a low level of corruption. Contrarily, in spite of China’s high level of corruption, 
its economic growth is very high. On the other hand, a country like Kenya experiences both 
high level of corruption and low level of economic growth.  This propels challenges to the 
claims of a negative/positive linear relationship between economic growth and corruption. 
In that respect, Swaleheen (2011) first finds a second order polynomial relationship 
between corruption and growth rate of real per capita income and the effect is more growth 
enhancing at higher levels that challenges Shleifer and Vishny (1993) which argue that 
corruption is more growth reducing at higher levels because of how corruption is organized. 
Hence, for further investigation a cubic non-linear framework is estimated in this paper to 
explore the degree of changes in economic growth due to a change by in perception of 
corruption. We question whether a growth of real GDP per capita increases or decreases in 
various level of perception of corruption i.e. at a low, medium and higher level of perception 
of corruption. 
Our purpose is to offer a systematic analysis for observed cross-country differences in 
growth and corruption in a cubic non-linear framework by employing panel data analysis. 
The principal part of our analysis draws on data about levels of corruption for over 146 
countries for the period 1984-2009 reported by International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). 
We supplement this with an additional analysis of an alternative dataset of corruption 
perception index measured by Transparency International (TI) available since 1995. The 
advanced panel estimation techniques have been utilized after controlling for fixed effects 
(both country and period) and endogeneity biases (as corruption and investment are 
endogenously determined in the sense that they are both correlated with exogenous shocks 
that affect the rate of economic growth) by employing system generalised methods of 
moments (SGMM), the most advanced, robust and well recognised technique in the literature. 
The next section explores the growth-corruption relationship in detail. Section 3 describes 
the models, data and econometric methodology and section 4 discusses the results. The final 
section concludes the analysis. 
 
2. Exploring the growth-corruption relationship 
The prevailing view is that corruption mainly affects investment and economic growth 
adversely. A payment of a bribe to get an investment license, for example, clearly reduces the 
incentive to invest (Bardhan, 1997, p. 1327). Corruption, particularly political or “grand” 
corruption, distorts the decision-making process connected with public investment projects 
(Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997). Corruption is likely to increase the number of projects 
undertaken in a country, and to change the design of these projects by enlarging their size and 
complexity. The net result is an increase in the share of public investment in GDP, a fall in 
the average productivity of that investment and (because of budgetary constraints) a possible 
reduction in some other categories of public spending, such as operation and maintenance, 
education and health. As a consequence, the rate of growth of a country decreases.  
Murphy et al. (1993) point out that an increasing return in rent-seeking activities lowers 
the cost of further rent-seeking relative to that of productive investment. When there is slow 
growth, the returns to productive activity fall relative to those of rent seeking. The ensuing 
increase in the pace of rent-seeking activities further slows down growth. It is also argued 
that public rent-seeking attacks innovation, since innovators need government-supplied 
goods such as permits and licenses more than established producers.  
Another growth effect follows from the allocation of talent. Murphy et al. (1991, p. 503) 
state that “people choose occupations that offer the highest returns on their abilities when 
they are free to do so”. Rosen (1981) claims that the ablest people choose occupations that 
exhibit increasing returns to their ability since the increasing returns allow “superstars” to 
earn extraordinary returns on their talents. When talented people become entrepreneurs, they 
help to improve the technology in the lines of business they pursue, and, as a result, 
productivity and income grow. In contrast, when they become rent-seekers, most of their 
private returns come from redistribution of wealth from others and not from wealth creation. 
As a result, talented people do not improve technological opportunities, and the economy 
stagnates. Growth can be much lower than possible if rent-seeking sectors offer most able 
people higher returns than the productive sectors. Bhagwati et al. (1984) also assert that 
corruption affects the allocation of human capital because it affects the returns on rent-
seeking vis-a-vis productive activities.  
Some of these growth effects have been statistically substantiated from cross-country data 
by Mauro (1995) and his study finds that there is a negative and significant association 
between corruption and growth via the effect on investment. Although the magnitude of the 
effect is considerable however, this study does not provide any robust evidence because the 
analysis is not adequate for the dynamic perspective. Furthermore, Mauro (1997, 1998) find 
that corruption reduces expenditures on health and education. As the opportunities to extract 
high rents from public expenditures on education and health are relatively less, corruption 
distorts public expenditures away from health and education and encourages excessive 
infrastructure and capital intensive investment. Hence, corruption reduces the productivity of 
public investment and the country’s infrastructure, which, in turn, has a damaging impact on 
the country’s economic growth. Gupta et al. (2001) confirm that corruption is associated with 
higher military spending as a share of both gross domestic product and total government 
spending, as well as with arms procurement in relation to GDP and total government 
spending. 
Wei (1997) analyses the adverse effects of corruption on foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and finds that corruption, acting like a tax, reduces foreign direct investment. He concludes 
that the less predictable the level of corruption, the greater is its impact on FDI, as higher 
variability discourages foreign direct investment by increasing risk and uncertainty. In 
another study, Mo (2001) introduces a new perspective on the role of corruption in economic 
growth and the most important channel through which corruption affects economic growth is 
political instability. In other words, corruption is most prevalent where other forms of 
institutional inefficiency, such as bureaucratic red tape and weak legislative and judicial 
systems are present.  
Oppositely, other studies (led by Leff, 1964 and Huntington 1968) claim that bribery and 
corruption can have positive effects. The efficiency-enhancing strand views corruption as 
increasing efficiency because corruption ‘greases the wheels’. In the context of pervasive and 
cumbersome regulations in the developing countries, corruption may actually improve 
efficiency and enhance growth by using speed money. In examining the positive effect of 
corruption on growth Méon and Sekkat (2005) and Mendez and Sepulveda (2006), 
incorporate the interaction terms between corruption/quality of government and economic 
freedom and find that corruption is beneficial to growth only with good governance and in a 
free country. Moreover, in a country study, Paul (2010) finds a positive association between 
corruption and growth in Bangladesh after the economy embarked on privatisation by 
unleashing private investment. 
Recently, Swaleheen (2011) tests corruption-growth relationship in a non-linear frame 
work (second degree polynomial) but the results show that corruption is not growth reducing 
at all levels and it significantly increases growth even at a higher level of corruption.
1
 In other 
words, corruption is more growth reducing when incidence of corruption is low than in 
countries where incidence of corruption is high. More importantly, this finding rejects the 
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) hypothesis that “corruption sands-in-the-wheel”. This result 
indeed fuels the so-called debate whether corruption is growth-enhancing or growth-reducing 
following two approaches, corruption as oil and corruption as sand in the machine, 
respectively.  
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This paper finds that corruption increases growth even in the second degree equation, for details, see 
Swaleheen (2011), page 35.   
By far, most empirical findings favour the negative linear relationship between corruption 
and growth i.e. corruption reduces growth; however, real life evidence shows some existence 
of positive corruption-growth relationship. Moreover, there is a rare cross-country study 
which captures the non-monotonic behaviour of corruption in influencing growth 
systematically. This paper evaluates the non-monotonicity of corruption-growth relationship 
at a third degree in a neoclassical growth model after extending the data set and controlling 
for fixed effects and endogeneity biases by utilising system generalised methods of moments 
(SGMM). The purpose is to examine the non-linear effects to determine whether results are 
consistent with the theory.  
 
3. Models, data and econometric methodology 
 
The corruption-growth relationship is examined by using a standard model of growth which 
is structured as follows: 
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where Rgdppcygr is the growth rate of real GDP per capita and CORR is the incidence of 
corruption. X
1
 is the vector of variables used by most cross country growth studies which 
have been able to explain a significant portion of the variation in real GDP per capita growth. 
They are SEC (secondary school enrollment rate), Popgr (the growth rate of population, Grat 
(government final consumption expenditure as a share of GDP)) and Irat (investment GDP 
ratio). X
2
 is the vector of institutional variables that include Open and Democracy (average of 
political rights and civil liberties). α0 is constant, β
1
 and  β2 are vectors of coefficients, η is 
unobserved country fixed effects and ɛ is error term. Subscripts i is country t is time. 
The purpose of including lagged per capita GDP growth rate is to consider the 
convergence effect highlighted in the neo-classical growth model and it is expected that the 
sign of the coefficient is negative. The sign and significance of α2, α3 and α4 are of interest; 
CORR coefficients are expected to be negative if corruption deteriorates the overall economic 
growth at all levels. 
Following neo-classical growth theory it is expected that a higher school enrollment and 
investment ratio to GDP should boost economic growth whereas, population growth and a 
higher value of government final consumption expenditure negatively affect the growth rate 
of per capita income (Mankiw et al., 1992). Theory suggests that the impact of openness and 
democracy should have positive impact on growth (Krueger, 1974 and Barro, 1999).  
The major obstacles of comparative studies of corruption have been the lack of a general 
definition of corruption and the absence of objective cross-national data on corrupt behaviour 
given its illegal and secret nature. The subjective index of corruption is used as a principal 
measure, source from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The ICRG index is 
constructed by Political Risk Services.
2
 It measures the corruption within the political system 
that threatens foreign investment by distorting the economic and financial environment and 
reducing the efficiency of government and business by enabling people to assume positions 
of power through patronage rather than ability. For simplicity and ease of exposition, the 
ICRG index has been converted into a scale from 1 (least corrupt) to 10 (most corrupt). We 
also use Transparency International’s Corruption perception index (CPI) for robustness 
check. The CPI index is a composite index based on individual surveys from different 
sources. The index is rescaled in the same scale like the ICRG index. 
Real GDP per capita growth (Rgdppcygr) is the dependant variable. The real GDP per 
capita income (Rgdppcy), openness (Open), and population (Pop) data are obtained from 
Penn World Table. Data on investment (Irat), government final consumption expenditure 
(Grat) and secondary school enrolment (Sec) are taken from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI) database. The data are based on annual observations 
however, we use both annual and the series’ long run information by taking averages over 
five year time intervals (five year time intervals: 1984-1988, 1989-1993, and so on). Due to 
missing data, the total number of countries used in any regression ranges from 128 to 146 for 
the period 1984-2009.  
 
3.1. Methodology  
In order to estimate the impact of corruption on growth, our benchmark model (equation 1) is 
estimated with ordinary list square (OLS), fixed effects and system GMM. Many researchers 
used OLS and 2SLS
3
, but there are advantages of GMM over IV and OLS. If 
                                                          
2
 The definition of corruption used is the misuse of public office for private enrichment in this study. See the 
Political Risk Services (PRS), http://www.prsgroup.com/countrydata.aspx. Also, the PRS data set is regarded as 
a reliable quantitative measure for the cross-national comparisons and it covers a large number of countries and 
is available since 1984. 
3
 For example, Chervin and Wijnbergen (2010) used OLS and 2SLS while estimating growth equation using aid 
volatility.  
heteroskedasticity is present, the GMM estimator is more efficient than the simple IV 
estimator. According to Baum et al. (2003), page 11-“------if heteroskedasticity is not present, 
the GMM estimator is no worse asymptotically than the IV estimator”. OLS estimation pools 
observations across cross sections and by using all the variation in the data tends to be more 
efficient than performing individual OLS on repeated cross sections. The pooled OLS, 
however, fails to account for the potential endogeneity of the right hand side variables.  
Specifically, it fails to account for potential country specific variations which are unmodelled 
and unobserved. In general, the variables measured with an error term tend to display a bias 
toward zero and OLS does not account for standard errors from the first stage estimator (see 
Arellano et al. 2009). Moreover, GMM addresses potential endogeneity concerns between the 
set of cross-country regressors and other country specific characteristics. Further, our model 
consists of more moment conditions than model parameters, and our panel dataset consists of 
a short time dimension and a larger country dimension (N =150)
4
. Therefore the use of GMM 
in this paper is appropriate as it addresses potential endogeneity problems of the regressors 
and incorporates fixed effects. Arellano and Bond (1991) pioneered the difference-GMM 
estimator while the system-GMM estimator is a product of the work done by Blundell and 
Bond (1998). Identification in both types of estimators is based on first-differencing and 
using lagged values of the endogenous variables as instruments. In the difference-GMM 
estimator (GMM-DIFF), lagged levels are used to instruments for the differenced right hand 
side variables, while for the system-GMM estimator (GMM-SYS) the estimated system is 
composed of a difference equation instrumented with lagged levels and additionally a level 
equation, which is estimated using lagged differences as instruments (Bond et al. 2001; Rajan 
and Subramanian 2008)
5
.  
 
We test the instrument validity by using Sargen test for over-identifying restrictions. We 
make sure we check whether deeper lags of the instrumented variables are correlated with 
deeper lags of the disturbances.  
 
4. Empirical results 
 
                                                          
4
 If the time dimension is large, then dynamic panel bias becomes insignificant – in such a case, a fixed 
estimator is recommended (see Roodman 2006). Further, as the time dimension of the panel increases, the 
number of instruments in the GMM-SYS and GMM-DIFF tends to explode; additionally, as the cross-sectional 
dimension increases, the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test may become unreliable.   
5
 We use the xtdpd command in STATA 10 to conduct all GMM regression analyses. 
The relationship between growth and corruption is illustrated with a Kernel fitted line in the 
scatter plots in Figure 1. The curve shows an existence of a non-linear relationship i.e. the 
curve is clearly increasing in the middle range of corruption and decreasing where corruption 
is least and most. In other words, it can be seen that initially as corruption increases per-
capita income growth reduces slightly and as corruption increases further per-capita growth 
increases and at a later stage when corruption increases above 6.5-7 on corruption scale, per-
capita growth reduces at a significant rate. The non-linear fitted line suggests that the “sands-
the-wheels” hypothesis exists at the polar ends of corruption whereas, “greases-the-wheels” 
effect exists at the middle range of corruption. In order to confirm this result the next step 
begins by estimating equation (1) with OLS for five year average data and the results are 
reported in Table 1. The corruption coefficients (measured by ICRG index) illustrate a 
significant negative linear term, positive squared and negative cubed terms indicating that 
initially, the function first tended downward, then upward then downward again (column 
(1)). In other words, the results suggest that corruption is growth reducing in the least and the 
most corrupt countries but it is growth enriching for the medium corrupt countries.  
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The coefficients for control variables show the expected signs. The coefficient of lagged 
per capita growth is positive but not significant. The coefficients for secondary school 
enrolment and investment are positive which increase growth. On the other hand, population 
growth and government final consumption expenditure coefficients are significant and 
negative in signs. Openness has a positive sign although not significant. The coefficient for 
democracy is negative (due to the inversion of democracy index and Rgdppcygr) indicating 
that democracy enhances growth. 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Column (2) shows the results for two-way fixed effects. The coefficients for corruption 
(linear, squared, and cubed terms) confirm the similar sign and significance level presented 
in column (1). Except lagged Rgdppcygr, other control variables have the expected sign. 
Overall, fixed effects results show that the partial effect of corruption on the rate of growth 
of real per capita GDP is statistically significant. The OLS and fixed effects estimation 
results using annual data strongly support our results (columns (3) and (4)). The similar 
results are obtained when corruption is measured by the CPI (columns (5)-(8)) although 
corruption coefficients are not always significant. 
Table 2 displays the results for GMM-system estimation. Column (9) shows that the linear 
coefficient for corruption is negative but not significant. The result suggests that there is not 
enough evidence that corruption is growth reducing. The quadratic model in column (10) 
illustrates a positive linear term and a negative quadratic term indicating a non-monotonic 
growth-corruption relationship although not significant. However, the results for the cubic 
model (column (11)) show a negative linear, a positive squared and a negative cubed term 
and all of these terms are highly significant. This result is robust and consistent with the 
results shown in Table 1. Moreover, the estimation results using annual series as well as CPI 
index confirm the significant cubic relationship between growth and corruption (columns 
(12)-(18)). The results indicate that corruption is not always growth deteriorating; it enhances 
growth for the medium corrupt countries. The model passes the Sargan test in most of the 
cases with few exceptions. The model also passes the test of absence of AR (2) in the error 
term in all cases which reveals the absence of second order serial autocorrelation. With robust 
estimation investment ratio to GDP is positive and statistically significant. The linear, 
squared and cubed coefficients of corruption continue to be statistically significant. 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The next step estimates the turning points of the cubic model. The relationship between 
growth and corruption begins with a negative relationship (see Figure 1) until growth reaches 
its (local) minimum at a corruption score of around 3.5 where it changes the direction (i.e. 
negative to positive) and then achieves a maximum at around 7.0 and then starts to decrease 
again. In other words, the growth rate of per capita income decreases with a corruption score 
less than 3.5, followed by an increase in the growth level with corruption level between 3.5 
and 7.0, and finally growth decreases substantially at the corruption scores that are larger than 
7.0. The list of least, medium and the most corrupt countries is presented in Table A1. The 
results reflect that corruption is growth-inhibitory for the least and the most corrupt countries 
whereas, it is growth-enhancing for the medium corrupt countries. 
Finally we estimate the growth-corruption relationship across least corrupt, medium 
corrupt and the most corrupt countries based on turning points i.e. corruption level below 3.5, 
between 3.5 to 7.0 and above 7.0. The estimate for the least corrupt countries (Column (19) 
Table 3) shows that corruption coefficient is negative although not significant illustrating that 
growth level decreases as the level of corruption increases. In contrast, the middle corrupt 
countries with corruption level between 3.5-7.0 (column (20) Table 3) display a positive and 
significant corruption coefficient suggesting that corruption enhances economic growth in 
these medium corrupt countries.  But the most corrupt countries demonstrate that corruption 
is a bad news for them (column (21)). When corruption is measured in terms of CPI provides 
the similar results and significant at least 10 percent level of significance. Overall, results in 
Table 3 reveal that corruption is growth-reducing for the least and the most corrupt countries 
however, corruption is growth-augmenting for the medium corrupt countries. 
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Appendix Table 2A summarises the level and growth of corruption and real GDP per 
capita and the initial real GDP per capita of these three groups of countries. It is seen that for 
the low-corrupt countries (the corruption level below 3.5) the average corruption growth is 
the highest and the per-capita RGDP growth is at 1.896 percent with a highest level of initial 
per-capita RGDP (for example, Australia and Switzerland). On the other hand, per-capita 
RGDP growth is the highest at 2.224 percent when the corruption level is between 3.5-7.0 
(for instance countries like China and India). When the corruption level is above 7.0 the per-
capita growth reduces to 1.317 percent although the initial level of per-capita RGDP is the 
lowest. In general, it is likely that the growth may rise at a faster rate if the initial RGDP is 
lower, but the higher level of corruption (greater than 7.0) may hinder growth in these most 
corrupt countries such as Kenya and Libya. Hence, the third degree cubic relationship 
explains the observed growth-corruption relationship more appropriately.  
 
 
5. Conclusion  
The negative effects of corruption have drawn economists’ interest in recent years. This paper 
evaluates the relationship between growth and corruption by employing a hierarchical 
polynomial regression after controlling economic and institutional factors.  In other words, it 
test whether “sand the wheels” hypothesis always apply in growth-corruption relationship. 
Our results find that there is a cubic relationship between growth and corruption, such that, for 
the least corrupt countries corruption impedes growth, but at intermediate levels corruption 
increases growth, and finally, at a higher level it substantially reduces growth. Hence, the 
“sands the wheels” hypothesis applies only in the polar cases; otherwise, corruption “greases 
the wheels” at the intermediate levels. 
Our empirical results confirm this cubic relationship for various estimation methodologies 
and corruption indices. In all empirical tests the cubic corruption coefficients are found to be 
significant at least 10 percent level. In the system GMM for ICRG index the corruption 
coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. The model passes the Sargan test and the 
absence of AR (2) process in the error term. In terms of turning point, we found corruption 
increases growth within the range around 3.5-7. This pattern is consistent with the “grease the 
wheels” hypothesis that in the medium corrupt countries corruption stimulates growth by 
reducing red-tape.  
The cubic relationship between growth and corruption illustrates that corruption is a major 
hindrance to growth in particular for the most corrupt countries such as some African 
countries. Hence controlling for corruption is vital that enhances economic growth for the 
most corrupt countries. The choice of policies is crucial dynamics for all nations that fight 
against corruption. Some studies emphasise the role of institutional reforms to fight 
corruption (see Asongu (2013) and Batuo and Asongu (2015)). On the other hand, 
Rosenbaum et al. (2013) find that policy-makers seeking to combat corruption may be more 
prudent to encourage multifaceted top-down reforms through prohibiting the tax deductibility 
of bribes, increasing the rotation of public officials or increasing custodial sentences. 
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 Table 1  
The relationship between growth and corruption using OLS and FE 
Dependent variable: RGDPPCYGR 
 Corruption measured by ICRG index Corruption measured by CPI index 
 
 5 year average Annual 5 year average Annual 
 OLS 
(1) 
FE 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
FE 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
FE 
(6) 
OLS 
(7) 
FE 
(8) 
Rgdppcygr(-1) 0.0535 
(0.139) 
-0.0745* 
(0.087) 
0.2209*** 
(0.000) 
0.1349*** 
(0.000) 
0.1360*** 
(0.002) 
0.0572 
(0.350) 
0.2635*** 
(0.000) 
0.1717*** 
(0.000) 
Corruption -0.0314*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0562*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0152*** 
(0.003) 
-0.0242** 
(0.011) 
-0.0128 
(0.146) 
-0.0538** 
(0.043) 
-0.0073 
(0.180) 
-0.0201 
(0.138) 
Corruption-SQ 0.0080*** 
(0.000) 
0.0124*** 
(0.000) 
0.0040*** 
(0.000) 
0.0056*** 
(0.002) 
0.0035* 
(0.081) 
0.0135*** 
(0.010) 
0.0017 
(0.166) 
0.0047* 
(0.069) 
corruption-CU -0.0005*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0008*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.0003* 
(0.060) 
-0.0009*** 
(0.003) 
-0.0001 
(0.147) 
-0.0003** 
(0.034) 
LnSEC 0.0048* 
(0.087) 
0.0135 
(0.163) 
0.0017 
(0.344) 
0.0043 
(0.428) 
-0.0027 
(0.548) 
0.0389** 
()0.026 
-0.0017 
(0.637) 
0.0187 
(0.108) 
Grat -0.0007*** 
(0.006) 
-0.0019*** 
(0.001) 
-0.0005*** 
(0.002) 
-0.0019*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0005 
(0.120) 
-0.0027** 
(0.015) 
-0.0004 
(0.150) 
-0.0019*** 
(0.004) 
Open 0.0000 
(0.397) 
0.0001 
(0.372) 
0.0000* 
(0.083) 
0.0000 
(0.737) 
-0.0000 
(0.986) 
-0.0000 
(0.806) 
0.0000 
(0.853) 
-0.0002 
(0.112) 
Popgr -0.4736*** 
(0.000) 
-0.7968*** 
(0.001) 
-0.4071*** 
(0.000) 
-0.4019*** 
(0.000) 
-0.8859*** 
(0.000) 
0.7553 
(0.225) 
-0.8248*** 
(0.000) 
-0.9989*** 
(0.001) 
Irat 0.0017*** 
(0.000) 
0.0022*** 
(0.000) 
0.0009*** 
(0.000) 
0.0010*** 
(0.000) 
0.0011*** 
(0.001) 
0.0000 
(0.926) 
0.0011*** 
(0.000) 
0.0012*** 
(0.000) 
Democracy -0.0004 
(0.666) 
-0.0054* 
(0.063) 
-0.0159 
(0.155) 
-0.0020 
(0.157) 
0.0023* 
(0.084) 
-0.0005 
(0.926) 
0.0031*** 
(0.001) 
-0.0047 
(0.137) 
R-squared 
 
0.461 0.281 0.595 0.341 0.298 0.049 0.6434 0.427 
F-test 
(p-value) 
160.84*** 
(0.000) 
10.08*** 
(0.000) 
387.91*** 
(0.000) 
19.92*** 
(0.000) 
78.79*** 
(0.000) 
3.62*** 
(0.000) 
285.52*** 
(0.000) 
12.13*** 
(0.000) 
No. Of 
countries/observation
s 
134/476 134/476 133/2505 133/2505 146/311 146/311 128/1206 128/1206 
Notes:  i) p- values in parentheses are with robust standard errors; ii)  ***, **, * indicate significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Table 2 
The relationship between growth and corruption using system GMM 
Dependent variable: RGDPPCYGR 
 Corruption measured by ICRG index Corruption measured by CPI index 
 5-year 
average 
(9) 
5-year 
average 
(10) 
5-year 
average 
(11) 
Annual 
 
(12) 
Annual 
 
(13) 
Annual 
 
(14) 
5-year 
average 
(15) 
Annual 
 
(16) 
Annual 
 
(17) 
Annual 
 
(18) 
Rgdppcygr(-1) -0.0962 
(0.252) 
-0.0989 
(0.243) 
-0.0390 
(0.425) 
0.0965*** 
(0.001) 
0.0912*** 
(0.001) 
0.1012*** 
(0.000) 
0.0020 
(0.970) 
0.1495** 
(0.015) 
0.1444** 
(0.015) 
0.1421** 
(0.013) 
Corruption -0.0009 
(0.783) 
0.0125 
(0.352) 
-0.0309*** 
(0.002) 
0.0008 
(0.639) 
0.0044 
(0.074) 
-0.0296** 
(0.047) 
-0.0927** 
(0.039) 
-0.0019 
(0.416) 
0.0057 
(0.325) 
-0.0205* 
(0.085) 
Corruption-SQ  -0.0012 
(0.322) 
0.0079*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.0003 
(0.506) 
0.0064** 
(0.021) 
0.0185** 
(0.036) 
 -0.0006 
(0.275) 
0.0050* 
(0.064) 
corruption-CU   
 
-0.0005*** 
(0.000) 
  -0.0004** 
(0.015) 
-0.0011** 
(0.027) 
  -0.0003* 
(0.061) 
LnSEC 0.0137 
(0.223) 
0.0175 
(0.170) 
0.0047 
(0.116) 
0.0208** 
(0.018) 
0.0216** 
(0.010) 
0.0169** 
(0.039) 
0.0732*** 
(0.000) 
0.0142** 
(0.047) 
0.0137* 
(0.053) 
0.0112 
(0.149) 
Grat -0.0019** 
(0.048) 
-0.0018* 
(0.054) 
-0.0008** 
(0.011) 
-0.0005 
(0.294) 
-0.0006 
(0.210) 
-0.0004 
(0.380) 
-0.0016 
(0.223) 
-0.0015** 
(0.018) 
-0.0015** 
(0.021) 
-0.0016** 
(0.019) 
Open 0.0001 
(0.587) 
-0.0000 
(0.928) 
-0.0001* 
(0.069) 
0.0002 
(0.130) 
0.0001 
(0.232) 
0.0001 
(0.150) 
-0.0001 
(0.636) 
0.0001 
(0.182) 
0.0001 
(0.197) 
0.0002 
(0.127) 
Popgr -0.6252 
(0.162) 
-0.6159 
(0.174) 
-0.5511*** 
(0.000) 
-0.2966*** 
(0.000) 
-0.3111*** 
(0.000) 
-0.3226*** 
(0.000) 
-1.8598* 
(0.089) 
-1.2615*** 
(0.004) 
-1.2481*** 
(0.005) 
-1.2260*** 
(0.005) 
Irat 0.0023*** 
(0.001) 
0.0024*** 
(0.000) 
0.0015*** 
(0.000) 
0.0013*** 
(0.000) 
0.0014*** 
(0.000) 
0.0014*** 
(0.000) 
0.0005 
(0.503) 
0.0014*** 
(0.000) 
0.0014*** 
(0.000) 
0.0013*** 
(0.000) 
Democracy -0.0148** 
(0.019) 
-0.0159** 
(0.013) 
-0.0004 
(0.768) 
-0.0042 
(0.163) 
-0.0037 
(0.189) 
-0.0040 
(0.130) 
0.0052 
(0.514) 
-0.0011 
(0.728) 
-0.0009 
(0.787) 
-0.0008 
(0.810) 
Maximum   6.949   7.293 7.056   6.770 
Minimum   2.749   3.363 4.013   2.919 
Autocorrell (1)  
p-values 
Autocorrell (2) 
p-values) 
-2.536 
(0.011) 
-0.696 
(0.486) 
-2.553 
(0.011) 
-0.471 
(0.638) 
-3.552 
(0.000) 
-0.170 
(0.865) 
-18.526 
(0.000) 
0.725 
(0.468) 
-19.164 
(0.000) 
0.569 
(0.570) 
-19.89 
(0.000) 
0.661 
(0.509) 
-3.285 
(0.001) 
N/A 
-4.9621 
(0.000) 
-1.136 
(0.256) 
-5.034 
(0.000) 
-1.134 
(0.257) 
-5.034 
(0.000) 
-1.1295 
(0.259) 
Sargan test-Statistic 
(p-value) 
Robust Robust Robust 1254.964 
(0.225) 
1353.409 
(0.364) 
1395.947 
(0.748) 
31.074 
(0.463) 
Robust Robust Robust 
No of Instruments  
No. of 
countries/observations  
72 
128/336 
72 
128/336 
98 
131/469 
122 
133/2308 
130 
133/2308 
134 
133/2308 
112 
87/165 
102 
112/1069 
105 
112/1069 
122 
112/1069 
Wald test (p-value) 50.39 
(0.000) 
54.52 
(0.000) 
90.22 
(0.000) 
84.61 
(0.000) 
89.67 
(0.000) 
111.17 
(0.000) 
93.65 
(0.000) 
87.54 
(0.000) 
92.23 
(0.000) 
84.97 
(0.000) 
Note: (i)For 5-year average all the three equations (using ICRG corruption index) are passed the Sargan test-we report p-values corrected using robust standard errors therefore the Sargan test 
stats are not reported. The results are similar using CPI corruption index, but the Sargan test are not passed therefore are not reported, but the results are available upon request. To do system 
GMM for any series requires at least three consecutive observations and the corruption data for CPI are not available for longer series especially when averaged for 5-year (Egger and Merlo 
2007, pp1538).  
ii) p- values in parentheses are with robust standard errors. 
iii)  ***, **, * indicate significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3 
Growth-corruption relationship in three different groups of countries (using system GMM) 
Dependent variable: annual growth rate per capita   
 Corruption measured by ICRG index Corruption measured by CPI index 
 Corrp 
(≤ 3.5) 
(19) 
Corrp 
(3.5 to 7.0) 
(20) 
Corrp 
(above 7.0) 
(21) 
Corrp 
(≤ 3.5) 
(22) 
Corrp 
(3.5 to 7.0) 
(23) 
Corrp 
(above 7.0) 
(24) 
Rgdppcygr(-1) 0.199** 
(0.011) 
0.0553 
(0.943) 
-0.1129 
(0.275) 
1.3281*** 
(0.000) 
2.122*** 
(0.000) 
0.1203 
(0.332) 
Corruption -0.0056 
(0.202) 
0.2405** 
(0.047) 
-0.0771*** 
(0.004) 
-0.1050*** 
(0.000) 
0.1053* 
(0.076) 
-0.0125** 
(0.047) 
Wald Chi-square 
(p-value) 
9.08 
(0.011) 
3.91 
(0.141) 
8.49 
(0.014) 
27.58 
(0.000) 
19.84 
(0.000) 
8.11 
(0.017) 
Sargan test-Statistic  
(p-value) 
260.206 
(0.000) 
12.373 
(0.135) 
76.403 
(0.137) 
17.087 
(0.584) 
10.040 
(0.691) 
59.911 
(0.992) 
Autocorrell (1) 
(p-value) 
-6.096 
(0.000) 
0.076 
(0.939) 
-5.088 
(0.000) 
-4.091 
(0.000) 
-4.046 
(0.000) 
-4.985 
(0.000) 
Auto Correlation (2) 
(p-value) 
1.165 
(0.244) 
-0.097 
(0.922) 
0.273 
(0.785) 
1.278 
(0.201) 
1.345 
(0.179) 
1.086 
(0.278) 
No. of 
countries/observations 
26/618 53/1163 61/476 28/379 52/522 61/476 
 
Notes:  i) p- values in parentheses are with robust standard errors. 
              ii)  ***, **, * indicate significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Figure 1 
Graph for corruption and per-capita growth:  
(X-axis = Corruption and Y-axis = Growth/Capita 
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Appendix  
 
Table A1 Country list for three groups of different level of corruption 
Below 3.5 3.5-7.0 Above 7.0 
Australia Switzerland Algeria India Saudi Arabia Albania Iraq Sierra Leone 
Austria 
United Arab 
Emirates Argentina Italy Senegal Angola Kazakhstan Solomon Islands 
Belgium United Kingdom Armenia Jamaica Slovak Republic Bangladesh Kenya Sudan 
Canada United States Bahrain Jordan Slovenia Belarus Kyrgyz Republic Syria 
Chile Uruguay Botswana 
Korea, Dem. 
Rep. South Africa Bolivia Libya Tajikistan 
Denmark 
 
Brazil Kuwait Sri Lanka Burundi Macedonia, FYR Tanzania 
Finland   Brunei Darussalam Latvia Taiwan Cambodia Mali Togo 
France   Bulgaria Lesotho Thailand Cameroon Mauritania Turkmenistan 
Germany 
  
Burkina Faso Lithuania 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. Moldova Uganda 
Hong Kong   China Madagascar Tunisia Congo, Rep. Mongolia Ukraine 
Iceland   Colombia Malawi Turkey Cote d'Ivoire Mozambique Venezuela, RB 
Ireland   Costa Rica Malaysia 
 
Ecuador Myanmar Vietnam 
Israel 
  
Croatia Malta   
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. Nepal Yemen, Rep. 
Japan   Cuba Mauritius   Gabon Nicaragua Zambia 
Luxembourg   Cyprus Mexico   Gambia, The Niger Zimbabwe 
Netherlands   Czech Republic Morocco   Georgia Nigeria 
 New Zealand   Dominica Namibia   Guinea Pakistan 
 Norway   El Salvador Oman   Guinea-Bissau Papua New Guinea   
Portugal   Estonia Panama   Guyana Paraguay   
Qatar   Ghana Peru   Haiti Philippines   
Singapore   Greece Poland   Honduras Russian Federation   
Spain 
  
Guatemala Romania 
  
Indonesia 
Sao Tome and 
Principe   
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Sweden   Hungary Rwanda   Iran Serbia   
 
 
 
Table A2 Summary table-Corruption, corruption growth, per-capita growth, economic growth and 
Initial per-capita RGDP 
Corruption level Corruption growth Corruption 
Per-capita RGDP 
growth 
Initial RGDP per-
capita (1984) 
  
    Below 3.5 1.2 1.969 1.896 22244.316 
3.5-7.0 0.9 5.802 2.224 8351.448 
Above 7.0 0.3 7.786 1.317 2866.683 
 
 
 
